After having become acquainted with the general method of the inductive argument based on the computation of probabilities, and evaluated it through the foregoing applications, we shall now proceed to apply it to the demonstration of the existence of the wise Creator. We shall follow the same steps as before.

1. We notice a constant concord between a vast number of individual phenomena and man's needs as a living being and the continuation of life for him. We find for instance, that any change or substitution of any of these phenomena could mean the extinction of human life on this earth, or at least its paralysis. We shall now give a few examples of these phenomena.

The earth receives from the sun a quantity of heat sufficient for the development of life and the fulfillment of the needs of living beings for heat, no more and no less. It has been observed that the distance separating the earth from the sun is-in complete harmony with the-amount of heat required for the existence of life on this earth. Had this distance been double its present measure, there would have not been enough heat to support life on earth. Conversely, if it were half its present measure, the heat would have been too intense for life to endure. We observe further that the earth's crust and the oceans together contain in their various chemical compounds a preponderant quantity of oxygen, such that it constitutes eight-tenths of all of the water in the world. In spite of this, and in spite of the great tendency of oxygen to combine with other chemical elements, still a portion of it remains free in order for it to participate in the formation of air. This portion provides one of the most essential conditions of life because all living beings, humans as well as animals, require it for breathing. Were all the oxygen on earth to be combined with other elements, it would not have been possible for life to exist. It has been further observed that the quantity of pure oxygen available accords perfectly. with ,man's needs in his everyday; practical life.

The air contains twenty-one percent oxygen had this ratio been greater, the environment would have been constantly, threatened with outbreaks of fire. Had this ratio, on the other hand, been smaller, life would have been difficult if not impossible. Nor would fire have been available in: sufficient quantity to fulfill its proper functions.

We observe another natural phenomenon which repeats itself millions of times throughout life. It is an activity which ensures the availability of a specific quantity of oxygen all the time. When humans and animals breathe in air, they inhale oxygen which is received by the blood and distributed throughout the body. Oxygen then begins the process of combustion of the food in the body, from which carbon dioxide is produced. Carbon dioxide then passes into the lungs and is exhaled, thus ensuring a constant flow of this gas. Carbon dioxide is in turn a necessary condition for plant life. Plants separate oxygen from it, which they breathe out into the air, purified and ready to be breathed in again. Through this exchange between animals and plants, it is possible to retain a constant quantity of oxygen and without it- this gas would have been unavailable and human life would never have been possible.

This exchange, moreover, is the result of thousands of natural phenomena which have coincided in order to produce this specific phenomena which is in perfect accord with the requirements of life. We further observe that nitrogen, because it is a heavy gas, has a tendency to descend. Thus when it combines with oxygen in the air it becomes light enough to be useful for life on earth. We observe also that the quantities of both oxygen and nitrogen which remain free in the air are in perfect proportion for the one to lighten the other. Were oxygen to increase or nitrogen to diminish, this process could not take place.

We notice that the air in the earth remains at a constant amount, not exceeding one millionth of the global mass. This quantity is just right to ensure the possibility of human life. Had it been greater or smaller, life would be difficult or even impossible. This is because its increase would have meant a greater pressure on human beings which they would not have been able to support. Like wise, any decrease in it would make it possible for meteors, which we see every day to burn all living things, and- even to penetrate the earths itself.

We further notice that the earth's crust, which absorbs carbon dioxide and oxygen, is so, structured that it cannot absorb them completely. Had it been thicker, it would have absorbed them, and plants, animals and men would have perished. Similarly, the distance of the moon from the earth is of a specific measure necessary for making human life on earth possible. Had this distance been relatively smaller, the tide caused by the moon would have been so strong as to move mountains from their places.

We observe many instincts in living beings. Even though an instinct is an abstract notion, incapable of observation by direct sense experience, the conduct which such instincts express is not abstract. It is, rather, a phenomenon perfectly capable of scientific observation. Instinctive conduct resulting from thousands of instincts with which we become acquainted in our daily life and scientific investigation, is in constant accord with the aim of promoting and protecting life. Such instinctive conduct is often on a high level of complexity and technical skill. If we were to break down this conduct into its individual components, we see that every component is perfectly suited for the promotion and protection of life.

The physiological structure of man exhibits millions of natural, physiological phenomena. Yet each phenomenon, both in its physiological role and structure, as well as in its close link with all other phenomena is always suited to the job of promoting life and protecting it. Let us consider, for instance, the group of phenomena which work together to produce the faculty of sight and help us to sense things around us in useful ways. The lens in the eye refracts images onto the, retina which is made up of nine layers. The last layer contains millions of rods and cones all arranged in such a way as to make possible the faculty of sight. There is one anomaly, namely, the image which is reflected onto the retina, which is reversed. This, however, is only a slight anomaly, because sight itself is not involved at this stage. Instead, the image is corrected by millions of nerves leading to the brain, where it is transmitted from the eye. Only then is the process of seeing complete, at which stage it begins to play its important role in the overall purpose of promoting life.

Even beauty, fragrance and splendour as natural phenomena are found to exist in environments - suited for their role of promoting life.

Thus flowers which are usually pollinated by insects are especially attractive, possessing bright, beautiful colours and enticing fragrances in order to attract the insect and therefore facilitate the process of pollination. Flowers, which are pollinated by air, on the other hand, do not possess these characteristics. The phenomenon of sexual pairs or mates in its general similarity between the physical structure of male and female in man, animals and plants, and in sexual interaction for the perpetuity of life, is yet another manifestation of the harmony of nature with the function of promoting life.

2. We find that, in millions of cases, the continuous harmony between natural phenomena and the process of insuring and promoting life may be explained by a single hypothesis which postulates a wise Creator of this universe who willed to provide this earth with the elements of life and Himself direct their functions. This hypothesis presupposes all these instances of harmony.

3. In the third step, we pose the following question: If the hypothesis of a wise creator were not actually demonstrable, what would the possibility of the existence of all these congruences between natural phenomena and the process of life preservation be without there being an intended purpose for this order? It is clear that the probability of this alternative must presuppose a vast number of coincidences. If, as we saw in a previous example, the possibility is very remote that the letter you received was not from your brother but from another person resembling him in all respects (since the possibility of resemblance of one thousand characteristics is very small), how great do you think is the probability that this earth on which we live was the creation of non-teleological matter, one which resembles the wise Creator in millions of attributes?

4. In the fourth step we conclude that the hypothesis presented in: the second step which postulates a Wise creator, is valid.

5. In the fifth step, we connect this prevailing possibility with the small probability which we postulated in the hypothesis of the third step. Since probability decreases as the number of coincidences in the contrary increases, it is natural for the degree of this probability to become so small that it cannot in any way compare with the high probability of the third step in the demonstration of any scientific law. This is because the number of coincidences which must be postulated in the third step is greater than that of the possibilities of the opposite case. Hence, every probability of this kind must in the end disappear. [12] Thus we reach the incontrovertible conclusion: that there is a wise creator of this universe as the innumerable signs (ayat) of His power and wisdom in the universe testify.

[12]. There are two further problems which must be over-come. First, it may be observed that any probable substitution for the wise Creator, in accordance with the method of inductive argument, requites that every phenomenon be fully adjusted to the process of life preservation and be the creation of a blind necessity in matter. It further requires that matter, in spite of inner contradictions and Its effects in itself, be the cause of whatever phenomena take place in it. The purpose of the inductive method is to establish a preference for the hypothesis of a wise creator over any substitute theory. This is because that hypothesis requires only one a priori supposition, namely, a wise being. Any substitute theory, on the other hand, pre-supposes practical necessities in matter equal to the number of the phenomena under investigation. The probability of such a substitute would be the probability of a large number of events and coincidences; it would therefore increasingly diminish until it completely disappears. This would be the case only if the hypothesis of a wise creator is not presupposed in explaining a large number of occurrences and coincidences. This appears to be the case because a wise creator, who would be an explanation for all the phenomena in the universe, must himself possess aspects of knowledge and power equal to their number. Hence, the number which this hypothesis must pre-suppose should equal the number of blind necessities which any substitute theory must presuppose. The question, then, must be asked: Which of the two hypothesis should be preferred?

In answer, it must be said that a preference arises from the fact that these blind necessities are completely unrelated, in that the presupposition of any one of them in no way determines the possibility of the existence or non-existence of any other one. This means in the language of the computation of probabilities that each occurrence must be independent from any other one, or at least the degree of probability of each must be independent from that of any other one. In contrast, the knowledge and potencies which are required by the hypothesis of a wise creator behind the phenomena under investigation, are not independent because what is required in the way of knowledge and power as cause of some of the phenomena, must also be required for all. Thus the presupposition of any number of aspects of knowledge or power is not in-different to the presupposition of any other number. Rather, the one is inherently required by the other. This further means, in the language of the computation of probabilities, that the possibility of the entire cluster of aspects of knowledge and power is conditioned by the fact that the possibility of some as inferred from the possibility of others is so high that it often reaches the level of absolute certainty.

If we wish to evaluate the aggregate of knowledge and power (which we must presuppose the wise Creator to possess) and compare it with its counterpart of blind necessities, as to their degree of probability, we must follow the method of the multiplication of the degrees of probability which is based on the principle of computation of probabilities. The value assigned to each member of this, aggregate must equal the of every other member, and so on. This computation, as we know, leads to the decrease of probability and as the computation factors diminish in number, the degree of improbability diminishes in like proportion. The multiplication principle, whether it be conditioned or independent, can demonstrate mathematically that in conditional probabilities we should multiply the degree of one with that of another; though we must presuppose the existence of the first member, which is often certain or very close to certainty. Thus the multiplication could not lead to absolute invalidation or to a very small degree of probability. This is in contrast to independent probabilities, each member of which would be neutral with regard to any other. In the first instance the computation would lead to great contradictions in value. From this would also result the necessity of a detailed application of one method in favour of the other, in order to explain the conditional principle of multiplication as well as the independent principle. ( For further clarification of the principle of independent and conditional probability, see al Usus al mantiqiyyah li'l istiqra, pp. 153-154.)

The other problem is that arising from assigning a value to the prior probability (Ihtimal qabli) of the case which has been demonstrated inductively. In order for this to be clarified, a comparison must be made between the inductive proof of the Creator, and its application in our previous example demonstrating that the letter you had received in the mail was actually from your brother. This example implies that the speed with which a person arrives at the belief that the letter he received was actually sent by his brother (even before opening the letter and reading it) is directly influenced by the probability of the case. This we call `the prior probability of the case.' If, before opening the letter, he supposes fifty per cent probability that his brother would send a letter to him, then he would quickly arrive at the belief that the letter was actually from his brother, in accordance with the five steps of the inductive argument already discussed. If, on the other hand, the possibility of receiving a letter from his brother is negligible, because there is a high degree of probability that his brother was dead, he would not so quickly conclude that the letter was from his brother, unless he receives further evidence.

What, then is the way to demonstrate the existence of the Creator on the analogy of the principle of prior probability of the case? In reality, the case of the existence of the wise Creator, praised be He, does not fall under the law of probability. It is rather, an a prior truth whose 'certainty man's native intuition (fitrah) and conscience or pure sentiment (wijdan) assert. If, however, we suppose that it is a case of probability and wish to demonstrate' it by the inductive method, then we would determine the value of its prior probability in the following manner.

We begin by considering every phenomenon under investigation independently. Two possibilities would then present themselves: One is that of a wise creator, the other of a bend necessity in matter. Since we are faced with two possibilities without any prior justification for preferring either one over the other, we should divide the numerical ratio of certainty equally between them, so that each would be assigned fifty per cent. Since, however, the probabilities in favour of a wise creator are interconnected and conditioned, in contrast with those of blind necessity, which are independent and unconnected, the multiplication results constantly in a decrease of the probability in the hypothesis of blind necessity and a constant in-crease of the probability of the hypothesis of a wise creator.

I have observed, however, after long study, that the reason why the inductive scientific argument does not meet with much approval in European thought and is rejected by thinkers like Bertrand Russel is the inability of those thinkers to overcome the two problems which we have here indicated and solved. (For an indepth discussion of the application of the inductive argument for the existence of a creator and the way in which it is possible to overcome these two problems, see al-Usus . . ., pp. 441-451.)