Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their
owners and that when you judge between people you judge
with justice; surely Allah admonishes you with what is
excellent; surely Allah is Seeing, Hearing. (Quran, 4:57 )
If we wanted to raise our study to
an adequate level, we would have to follow the methods
of the scientific research in studying two sides:
Abu Bakr’s situation on the
Prophet’s inheritance
The first side: Abu Bakr’s situation regarding the
inheritance of Fatima (s) that he justified according to
a tradition, which he alone narrated from the Prophet
(s) about the matter of inheritance. He narrated the
tradition in different ways and different statements for
the confrontations between him and Fatima (s) were many,
so each saying of his had a different form and different
statements according to the phrases that came to his
mind at the time of each confrontation between them. [1]
1. Before all we want to note how
certain the caliph was of the truthfulness of the tradition,
which he found that it showed that the Prophet (s) did not
bequeath. How certain was he that he had heard it from the
Prophet (s) and whether he changed his mind or not?
We can understand that from the
traditions[2]
saying that the caliph gave Fadak back to Fatima and the
case was about to be ended unless Omar came and said to the
caliph: “What is this?” Abu Bakr said: “It is a document I
wrote for Fatima confessing her right of her father’s
inheritance”. Omar said: “What will you spend on the Muslims
and as you see that the Arabs stand against you?” He (Omar)
took the document and tore it. [3]
We quote this tradition cautiously although we may believe
in its truthfulness because every thing would encourage not
narrating this story unless it had something of reality. If
it was true, it would mean that (the attempt of) giving
Fadak to Fatima (s) occurred after Fatima’s eternal speech
and when Abu Bakr denied the Prophet’s inheritance by
narrating his odd tradition, because of the wars of
apostasy, Omar referred to in his saying, took place ten
days after the day of the saqeefa[4]
and Fatima’s speech was in the tenth day too. [5]
2. Abu Bakr showed his regret for not giving Fadak to Fatima
when he was about to die. [6]
He was
so moved that once he said to the
people gathering around him: “Revoke your pledge of homage
to me!” We perceive by this that the caliph was so worried,
feeling that he had committed a great mistake in his
judgment against Fatima without a certain evidence. His
conscience became so excited and he could not find a
justification that might quiet his worried soul. He was
unable to bear this bitter condition so his soul was brimmed
to express the regret for his situation towards Fatima at
the last hour of his life; the critical hour, in which one
would review all the scenes one had acted on the stage of
life when feeling that the curtain was about to be lowered,
and the different threads of one’s life gathered in one’s
memory that were about to be cut and nothing would remain
but the burden of the sins committed.
3. Let us not forget that Abu Bakr had
recommended in his will [7]
to be buried beside the Prophet’s tomb. This would not be
except if he had recalled his tradition, in which he had
narrated that the Prophet (s) did not bequeath, and then he
asked his daughter (Aa’isha) permission to be buried in her
share of the Prophet’s inheritance (in the house)-if the
wife would have a share of land and if that share of land
would be enough for Abu Bakr-or if he thought that what the
Prophet (s) had left was to be as common charity for all the
Muslims, then he had to ask permission of all of them.
Suppose that the adults permitted him, what about the minors
and the children at that time?
4. We knew well that Abu Bakr had not seized the Prophet’s
wives’ houses, in which they lived during the Prophet’s
lifetime, so what was the reason that made him seize Fadak
from Fatima (s)
and make its yields for the public
interests while he let the Prophet’s wives make use of their
houses as real keepers so that he asked Aa’isha permission
to let him be buried in her house? Did the verdict of not
bequeathing concern the Prophet’s daughter only? Were the
wives’ houses their donations? We are to know what made the
caliph do that without any evidence despite that no one of
the wives had claimed that the house was hers. Inhabiting a
house by a wife during the Prophet’s lifetime did not mean
that she became the owner because it was not private
ownership but it was as part of the Prophet’s ownership as
for any wife and a husband. This verse
(And
stay in your houses. 33:33)
did not mean that the houses were theirs because a little
after that the houses were ascribed to the Prophet where
Allah said:
(O
you who believe! do not enter the houses of the Prophet
unless permission is given to you. 33:35)
If the order of the Quran was sufficient evidence, this
verse must be taken into account. It was mentioned in the
Sunni books of Hadith that the house was ascribed to the
Prophet when he had said: “Between my house and my minbar
there is a garden of Paradise”. [8]
5. Let us ask the caliph about the verdict that the prophets
did not bequeath. Did it concern Muhammad (s) only and he
kept it secret until it would be required to be applied to
Fatima only from among all the heirs of the other prophets?
Did the other prophets ignore it? Did they not inform their
successors and heirs of it because of their greed of the
transient wealth in order to remain with their sons and
families? Or did they follow the verdict of not bequeathing
but it was not mentioned
in all the histories of the
nations? Or did the actual policy at that time establish
this verdict?
6. On the other hand could we
accept that the Prophet (s) would bring distresses and
disasters for his most beloved one, at whose displeasure
he would be displeased, for whose delight he would be
delighted and for whose distress he would be distressed?[9]
Nothing would cost him to keep all those distresses away
from his daughter more than to tell her the truth if
there was such a thing. Would the Prophet (s) be pleased
if his daughter suffered and faced ordeals and that
ordeals would widen to be a cause for disagreement among
all the Muslims whereas he was sent by Allah to be a
source of mercy? Did he conceal it from his daughter
while he had revealed it to Abu Bakr?
The variations of Abu Bakr’s
tradition
1. In order to have a look at the
tradition from the moral side, we divided the way of
narrating the tradition into two parts:
The first:
It was mentioned that Abu Bakr cried when Fatima (s)
talked with him and said: “O daughter of the messenger
of Allah, I swear by Allah that your father did not
bequeath a dinar or a dirham and he said that the
prophets did not bequeath”. [10]
It was mentioned too that when Fatima did her speech he
said: “I have heard the Prophet saying: We, the
prophets, do not bequeath gold and silver nor lands,
properties or houses but we bequeath faith, wisdom,
knowledge and the Sunna”. [11]
The second: Abu Bakr narrated that the Prophet
had said: “We do not bequeath. What we leave is to be as
charity”. [12]
2. The important point in this research
is to know whether these ways of the tradition lead clearly,
without any doubt or other interpretation-the proviso (nass)[13]
according to the scholars of Hadith-to that what the Prophet
(s) had left would be as inheritance or it could lead to
another meaning even if it apparently gave an impression
showing the verdict of not bequeathing. The matter had a
third account that was not to outweigh the meaning that
served the caliph more than the other meanings the wording
might have, which was called (mujmal) summary. [14]
3. If we noticed the first variations of the tradition, we
would find that the tradition might not refer to the
legislation of bequeathing by the prophets but to another
thing that the Prophet (s) wanted to clear; that was to
glorify the prophethood and to exalt the prophets. There was
no clearer aspect of the spiritual loftiness and the divine greatness than to be
ascetic with regard to the evanescent luxuries and pleasures of the worldly
life. Could not we suppose that the Prophet (s) wanted to show that the prophets
were angelic people or people of the highest rank that
they would not be affected by the earthly egoism or the
human tendencies, because their nature was derived from
the elements of the Heaven flowing with goodness and not
from the elements of the earthly world? They always and
for ever were the sources of good and light. They were
devisors of faith and wisdom. They fixed the divine
authority on the earth. They were not the sources of
material wealth and they did not look forward to its
values. So why did not we consider his saying: “We the
prophets do not bequeath gold or silver nor lands or
properties or houses” as metonymy referring to this
meaning? Their bequeathing of these things did mean
owning them and leaving them after their death whereas
in fact they turned away from all these things. Hence
the wording showed not bequeathing because the prophets
did not have anything to bequeath as if we said: “the
poor men do not bequeath” not because the verdict of
inheritance does not include them but because they do
not have anything to bequeath. The real aim of the
Prophet’s saying was to show the loftiness of the
prophets. This style of eloquence agreed with the
wonderful styles of the Prophet’s speech, which were
full of such great meanings in short statements.
4. In order that you agree with me on a certain
interpretation for this tradition, we have to know the
meaning of bequeathing so that we can understand the
sentence that negated bequeathing in the tradition.
Bequeathing means leaving something as inheritance; that
is to say that the legator is he, who becomes a cause of
transmitting a property
from the dead to his relative. [15]
This transmitting depends on tow conditions:
First: the existence of the patrimony.
Second: the law that lets the heir have
a share of the dead’s property. The first condition happens
by means of the dead himself and the second condition
happens by means of the legislator, who establishes the law
of inheritance, whether he is an individual, who is
entrusted with the legislative competence by people, or a
society responsible for that or a prophet legislating
according to the orders of the Heaven. Each of the dead and
the legislator has a share in deciding the inheritance but
the real legator is the dead, who founds the matter of the
inheritance, because it is he, who prepares for the
inheritance its second condition whereas the legislator is
not a real legator because by establishing the law he cannot
generate any inheritance. In fact he just legislates a law
saying that if the dead leaves a property, it will be for
his relatives. This is not enough to find inherited wealth
unless the dead actually has left some of his own properties
after his death.
So the legislator is like that, who adds a special nature to
an element that enables it to burn whatever it meets. Then
if you throw a piece of paper into it and the paper burns,
you will be the one that burns it and not that one, who adds
the burning element to that nature. The principle justifying
that is to say that everything is ascribed to the final
influence on it. In the light of this principle we know that
ascribing bequeathing to somebody means that he is the final
influence on the inheritance and it is he, who founds the
patrimony.
It is understood from the statement
(the prophets do not bequeath) that they do not prepare for
the inheritance its final condition for they do not try to
gather wealth and then to leave them for their heirs after
their death. So the meaning of (the prophets do not
bequeath) does not deny the legislative bequeathing because
the verdict of the inheritance is not the real bequeathing
but the real bequeathing is to prepare the patrimony, which
is the matter of the inheritance. It is this, which was
denied by the tradition.
On the other way, if the bequeathing
that the Prophet denied was the legislative bequeathing it
would mean canceling the law of bequeathing from the Sharia
of the Heaven. This could not be because the legislative
bequeathing did not concern the prophets’ heirs only. If the
denial referred to the real bequeathing it would mean that
the prophets had no wealth in order to bequeath and so Abu
Bakr’s justification would be in vain.
5. In the first narration of the
tradition Abu Bakr said: “By Allah, your father did not
bequeath a dinar or a dirham”. [16]
It showed clearly that the Prophet (s) did not leave any
money. If Abu Bakr used that statement to refer to this
meaning, then the tradition would lead to denying the
patrimony and not the legislative bequeathing.
6. If we noticed the examples mentioned in the second variation
of the tradition, we would find what confirmed the importance of this
interpretation because mentioning gold, silver, properties and houses did not
agree with the tradition that the patrimony was not to be bequeathed whereas
every thing, even the insignificant things, must be mentioned
to show that the verdict included every thing. If we wanted
to show that the unbeliever was not to inherit from his
(Muslim) father’s inheritance, we would not say that he was
not to inherit gold, silver or a house but we would say that
he was not to inherit anything of his dead father’s
patrimony. It was clear that showing the generality of the
verdict required showing some kinds of properties in order
that no one would think that these kinds of properties were
not among the patrimony, which would not be bequeathed.
Saying that the prophets do not bequeath or the unbelievers
were not to inherit their fathers’ inheritance shows that
properties, houses, gold, silver and other valuable things
of inheritance do not move to the heirs. Mentioning these
things in the tradition might show that the meaning of (the
prophets do not bequeath) was to confirm that the prophets
did not pay any attention for such transient things of this
limited worldly life, for which the rabble competed, for it
was suitable for this purpose to mention these significant
properties, whose owning and bequeathing contradicted the
concept of asceticism and the high spiritual ranks. As for
informing of not bequeathing in the Sharia, it would be more
appropriate to mention the insignificant kinds of patrimony
rather than the clear significant kinds.
7. Another thing that confirmed what we said about the
interpretation of the tradition was the second part in the
tradition: (but we bequeath faith, wisdom, knowledge and the
Sunna). [17]
It did not show the legislation of inheriting these things
but it showed that the prophets had these things that they
could spread among people. Then we
could understand from the first sentence, which denied
bequeathing, that the prophets did not try to gain gold,
properties and the likes, therefore they did not have
any to leave for their heirs as inheritance.
8. We are not to compare the
Prophet’s tradition: (People are not to bequeath
anything to the unbeliever of their relatives)[18]
with that tradition but we have to differentiate between
the two because if the legislator talks about those, for
whom he legislates laws, it is clear from his speech
that he imposes on them a verdict. When the Prophet
informs of that people do not bequeath to the unbeliever
of their relatives, it is not to be considered as just
informing but it shows that the unbeliever is not to
inherit according to the Prophet’s Sharia. It is
different from that one narrated by Abu Bakr because
that tradition talks about the prophets and not a group
of people included in the Prophet’s legislations and
verdicts. So there is nothing referring to a verdict
behind the informing of not bequeathing by the prophets.
9. You are not to object by saying that the prophets
often owned something of what were mentioned in the
tradition for it would mean that the tradition was
untrue. You may remember that what was denied related to
the prophets was bequeathing, which had a special
meaning that was to say: ascribing the patrimony to the
legator. This ascribing depended on that the legator sought to gain properties,
which would be left as inheritance after his death, exactly as the meaning
of the educator, which depended on using the means of the
education. If someone could read the thoughts of one of the
ethicists and educated himself according to those thoughts
then we would not call that ethicist as educator because
founding anything whether it was educating, bequeathing,
teaching or the like would not be ascribed to a person
unless that person had a positive action and a noticeable
influence on the achievement of that thing. Even if the
prophets had some properties or houses, it was not because
of their seeking to gain wealth like other people. The
tradition did not show that the prophets did not bequeath or
did not leave properties but it showed their high ranks and
excellences. As long as the tradition referred to this
meaning and its main aim was not behind the literary meaning
of the words so it was not impermissible that the prophets
might have some properties for the good intents. In the past
he, who described a generous man as “he had a lot of ashes”, [19]
was not to be considered as liar whether there was ash in
the generous man’s house or not because he did not want
actually to describe him so but he wanted to refer to his
generosity because the clearest sign of generosity in those
days was the amount of food cooked, which would leave a lot
of ashes. And so not bequeathing was the clearest sign of
asceticism and piety. Hence the Prophet (s) might have
referred to the piety of the prophets by saying: “The
prophets do not bequeath”.
10. In order to perceive the meaning of the second variation
of the tradition we have to distinguish between three
possible meanings:
First:
the patrimony of the dead is not inherited. This means
that what the dead owned until his death will not move
to his heirs but it becomes as charity after his death.
Second:
what the deceased had paid during his lifetime as
charity or what he had given to certain parties would
not be inherited but would remain as charity and entail
(waqf).
The heirs would inherit other than the charities of
the properties that the dead owned during his lifetime.
Third:
the dead had no properties to be inherited and what he
would leave would be charities and entails.
If we recognized the differences between these three
meanings, the tradition would appear unclear and in need
of researching and testing. In fact in its
interpretation there were many possibilities and it
could include all the items mentioned above. The second
half of the tradition (what we leave is to be as
charity) might be an independent sentence with full
meaning or a complement for the sentence (we, the
prophets, do not bequeath). In the first case the
tradition agreed with the first and the third meanings
because the sentence (what we leave is to be as charity)
might mean that the patrimony would not transfer to the
heirs after the owner’s death but it would be considered
as charity or it might refer to the third meaning that
all the patrimonies would be considered as charity and
the dead had not owned anything to bequeath as if the
dead before his death referred to the properties and
said: “All these properties are not mine. They are for
charity and I am just responsible for them”. If we
considered the entire tradition as having one
independent meaning, it would refer to the second
meaning that the charities, which the dead had given
during his life,
would be excluded from the other parts
of the inheritance. The same would be understood from the
tradition if the wording was reversed as the following: (we
do not bequeath what we leave as charity). It showed that
only the charities would not be inherited but not the rest
of the patrimonies were charities. Hence the tradition would
be as evidence to prove that the charity was not to transfer
to the heirs and not to cancel the legislation of
bequeathing at all.
11. So we have put many meanings for the tradition in order
to show its real content. Saying that the Prophet’s
properties were to be as charity after his death, would not
be preferred to the other two meanings. In fact we would
prefer the second meaning: (what was left as charity would
be excluded from the other parts of inheritance) if we
pondered on the plural pronoun the Prophet (s) used in the
tradition. The use of this pronoun by the Prophet to refer
to himself would not be acceptable unless it was used
metaphorically. Moreover it was far away from the Prophet’s
humbleness in all his sayings and doings. The evidences
confirmed that the pronoun referred to a group and the
verdict decided by the tradition concerned the group and not
the Prophet (s) alone. According to the principles of
expression it was most suitable for this statement to refer
to the group of the Muslims and not the group of the
prophets because the tradition had no any context referring
to the prophets. You cannot object by saying that the
tradition might have a context when it was said by the
Prophet (s) or it was preceded by an indication showing that
the pronoun related to the group of the prophets because Abu
Bakr had not mentioned anything of that, although the
narrator of any tradition had to
mention every thing concerning it in
order to make interpreting it easy therefore your objection
will be vain. Furthermore, ignoring these details was not
for Abu Bakr’s benefit. So let the actual wording of the
tradition be identical to the actual situation of Abu Bakr
no more no less.
It was understood that the pronoun referred to the group of
the Muslims, who were attendant when the Prophet (s) said
the tradition. It was ordinary that if a speaker wanted to
say something among a group of people and used the plural
pronoun of the first person, he would refer by the pronoun
to the attendant group. If a jurisprudent was among his
friends and he began to talk to them using the plural
pronoun, it would be understood that he meant by the pronoun
himself and the attendant friends and not the group of the
jurisprudents, whom he was one of. If he wanted to refer to
another group, his speech in this matter might be considered
mysterious and unclear. In the light of this account, what
would you think about this verdict that the tradition had
determined for the Muslims, whom we established that the
pronoun concerned? Could it show that a Muslim was not to
bequeath his patrimony? Were the properties every Muslim had
not his own but they were to be considered as charities?
Certainly not! This did not agree with the necessities of
the Islamic Sharia. According to the holy Quran the Muslim
had the right to own in different ways and had the right to
bequeath what he would leave after his death
(after
(the payment of) a bequest he may have bequeathed or a debt).[20]
Perhaps
it is clear now that the verdict is not
but that the charity is not to be inherited. This is an
important thing and it does not concern a certain charity
but it concerns all the charities of the Muslims. It was no
wonder in showing the verdict of not bequeathing the
charities in the first age of legislation, because the laws
and the verdicts of the Sharia were not yet fixed and
widespread among the Muslims and there was a possibility of
revoking the charities and entails and they would transfer
to the heirs when the owner died. This interpretation could
not be undermined even though Fatima (s) did not mention it
and did not protest by it against the caliph.
Firstly because the critical situation
of Fatima (s) in those difficult times did not let her
debate these minute arguments because the ruling authority,
which wanted to carry out its decisions strictly, controlled
the situation with firmness and determination that did not
accept any argument. Hence we found that Abu Bakr did not
answer Fatima (s) when she protested by the Quranic verses
talking about the matter of inheritance with more than to
say: “It is so”. [21]
So the fate of these arguments, if they had a share in the
revolt, would face but denial and failure.
And secondly because these arguments had nothing to do with
Fatima’s aim, which was to do away with the entire regime of the new caliphate.
It was natural that she depended on the means that were nearer to achieve her
aim. You found her in her eternal speech talking to the
minds and the hearts of people together but she did not
exceed in her protest the intuitive methods, which was
ignored by the caliph. This indifference of the caliph
was about to be denied by everyone which would lead to a
fierce opposition.
She denied the availability of any evidence in the holy
Quran confirming the rule of the caliph Abu Bakr. Then
she mentioned the verses legislating the succession
among all the Muslims. [22]
Then she mentioned the verses talking about the
succession of some prophets like Prophet Yahya (John)
and Prophet Dawood (David). Then she argued the case in
another way that if what Abu Bakr followed was true, he
would be more aware than the Prophet (s) and his
guardian Imam Ali because they both had not told her of
that verdict and if they had known it, they would
definitely have told her of it. It was definitely that
Abu Bakr could never be more aware of the Prophet’s
inheritance than the Prophet (s) or than Ali, whose
guardianship[23]
to the Prophet (s) was confirmed by her saying: “O ibn
Abu Quhafa, [24]
is it mentioned in the Book of Allah that you inherit
your father but I do not inherit my father? Surely you
have done a strange thing! Did you intendedly desert the
Book of Allah and turned your back on it? Allah said:
(And
Sulaiman was Dawood's heir
Qur’an
27:16)
and said about Yahya bin Zachariah:
(Grant
me from Thyself an heir, who should inherit me and inherit
from the children of Yaqoub. Qur’an 19:5-6)
and said:
(And
the possessors of relationships are nearer to each other in
the ordinance of Allah. Qur’an 8:75)
So did Allah distinguish you with a verse, from
which He excluded my father? Or do you say: people of two
religions do not inherit each other? Am I and my father not
of one religion? Or are you more aware of the Quran than my
father and my cousin?”[25]
The more prominent side of Fatima’s
revolt was the sentimental side. It was no wonder that
Fatima (s) tried her best to gain the battle of the heart
for it was the first ruler of the soul and it was the
cradle, in which the spirit of revolt grew up. Fatima (s)
had succeeded in forming a wonderful image, by which she
shook the feelings, electrified the sentiments and dominated
the hearts. It was the best weapon for a woman having the
same circumstances of Fatima (s).
In order to enjoy that wonderful image painted with the
finest colors, let us listen to Fatima when she addressed
the Ansar by saying: “O high-born people, you are the strong
guards of the religion and the nourishers of Islam. What is
this languor in helping me, this slowness in assisting me,
this indifference to my right and this dozing towards my
being wronged? Did not the Prophet say: “Being loyal to a
man is by being loyal to his offspring”? How quickly you
changed the Sunna and how hurriedly you achieved your own
intents. Was it because the Prophet died that you made his
religion
die? By Allah, his death was a
great calamity, whose effect became greater. Its rip
became obscure and there was no one to mend it. The
earth became so dark. The mountains submitted. The hopes
died. The sanctities were lost after him. The
inviolabilities were profaned. It was a great misfortune
that the Book of Allah informed of it even before the
Prophet’s death. Allah said:
(And
Muhammad is no more than an apostle; the apostles have
already passed away before him; if then he dies or is
killed will you turn back on your heels? And whoever
turns back on his heels, he will by no means do harm to
Allah in the least and Allah will reward the grateful.
Quran 3:144)
Ah, people of Ouss and Khazraj, [26]
my father’s inheritance was extorted in front of your
sight and hearing. My call reaches you and you are with
great number of men and arms. [27]
You are the elite that Allah preferred and the choice
that He chose…etc.”[28]
Hence the arguments about the
interpretation of the tradition would not be accepted by
the ruling authority nor did it have anything to do with
the main aim of the revolt of Fatima (s). This explained
for us why Fatima did not mention the donation (of Fadak)
in her speech.
The
situation of the caliph towards the matter of the
inheritance
1. Now we have to clarify the caliph’s situation towards
Fatima about the matter of the inheritance and to show
his opinion about it after we have clarified the meaning
of the tradition through the different ways of narrating
whether the meaning was clear or ambiguous. His
situation seems to be somehow complicated if we study
the historical
documents of the case thoroughly.
Although the documents are many, it is ambiguous to know the
point, on which the two opponents disagreed and it is
difficult to unify this point.
People thought that the object of the
disagreement between Abu Bakr and Fatima was the matter of
the prophets’ inheritance. Fatima claimed that they
bequeathed and Abu Bakr denied that. Accounting the
situation in this way would not solve the matter and would
not interpret many issues:
First: the saying of Abu Bakr to Fatima when she
asked for Fadak: “This property was not the Prophet’s
but it concerned the Muslims. The Prophet (s)
spent from it on the soldiers and for the sake of Allah.
When the Prophet died I managed it as he did”. [29]
This saying showed clearly that he was arguing about
something else than the prophets’ inheritance.
Second:
his saying to Fatima in another dialogue: “By Allah, your
father is better than me and you are better than my
daughters but the messenger of Allah had said: “We do not
bequeath. What we leave is to be charity”. [30]
This explanatory sentence that the caliph added to the
tradition needs some attention. It makes us understand that
the caliph thought that the verdict determined in the
tradition concerned Prophet Muhammad and it was not
certified to concern the inheritance of the other prophets
or the rest of the Muslims. He defined the patrimony that
would not be bequeathed and mentioned that the Prophet meant
it by the tradition. According to this, we understand that
Abu Bakr did not mean not bequeathing the
charities, because this was a general
verdict and did not concern the Prophet only. It was clear
also that Abu Bakr did not interpret the tradition as: (the
Prophet’s properties were not to be inherited but they were
to be considered as charities after his death) because if he
thought so in understanding the tradition, his
interpretation would refer to another matter. The subject of
the tradition then would refer to all of the Prophet’s
patrimonies and not to the actual property, which Fatima
asked for. By this I mean that if these properties were
excluded from the Prophet’s ownership before his death, the
verdict of not bequeathing would not affect them. In the
same way, if the Prophet had other properties, he would not
bequeath them to his relatives too. So not bequeathing of
the Prophet’s properties, if it was proved, would concern
all the Prophet’s properties whether those, which he left or
others. It would not be right to say that he meant by the
inheritance the specific properties that Fatima asked for.
As if you said to your friend: “honor
every one visits you tonight!” Then two persons visited him.
You did not mean by your saying these two persons in
particular yet the order complied with these two persons by
chance. So limiting the patrimonies that would not be
inherited to certain properties required that the verdict
mentioned in the tradition to concern these certain
properties only.
No doubt if the Prophet’s patrimonies were not to be
inherited, the verdict would not be assigned to those
certain properties but it would be applied to every property
that the Prophet (s) would leave after his death. With
regard to the scientific relevance of the research, I want
to ask about the use of the explanatory sentence and the aim
behind
it
whether the opinion of the caliph about the tradition was
that the Prophet’s properties were not to be inherited. Was
it suspected that the meaning of patrimony referred to the
actual properties, which Fatima asked for, or not and then
he wanted to remove the suspicion in order that the
tradition would agree with the meaning so that the verdict
of not bequeathing would be proved? If this account was
true, the suspicion would be in the interest of the caliph
because if it was not certain that an asset was a part of
the dead’s patrimony, it would not transfer to the heirs.
Hence it was not possible that the caliph wanted to remove
this suspicion and it was not possible that he wanted to
prevent Fatima from arguing about the application of the
tradition to the properties she asked for because as long as
she asked for the properties as inheritance so she obviously
acknowledged that they were among the Prophet’s patrimonies.
Let us suppose that those properties were a part of the
Prophet’s patrimony and not all what the Prophet (s) had
left-it might refer to the real estate like Fadak-so can we
guess that the aim of the caliph was to limit the properties
that Fatima had no right to inherit? I do not think so
because the Prophet’s patrimonies did not differ in
bequeathing or not bequeathing. We derive from these
reflections a result that the caliph’s intent from this
tradition of the Prophet that these properties were not his
property and he described them by saying: “What we leave is
to be charity”, so he was, in this respect, as that, who
gathered his heirs and said to them: “All my patrimonies are
to be for charity” trying to tell them that they were not
his properties so they could not inherit them. This is the
meaning that can be understood from the caliph’s tradition.
Third:
the caliph’s answer to a messenger sent by Fatima to ask
for the Prophet’s properties in Medina and Fadak and the
remainder of the khums of Khaybar when he said to the
messenger: “The Prophet (s) said: “We do not bequeath.
What we leave is to be charity. Muhammad’s family spends
from this money”. By Allah, I will not change anything
of the Prophet’s charities. They will remain as they
were during the Prophet’s lifetime”. [31]
If we supposed that the meaning of the tradition
according to Abu Bakr’s opinion was that the Prophet (s)
did not bequeath his properties, then Abu Bakr’s speech
would be contradicted because his conclusion in the
beginning of the tradition showed that he confessed that
what Fatima asked for was among the Prophet’s
patrimonies and properties he left after his death, but
his last sentence of the tradition: “By Allah, I do not
change anything of the Prophet’s charities. They will
remain as they were during the Prophet’s lifetime”
opposed this meaning because what Fatima wanted to
change-as Abu Bakr claimed-was Fadak, the Prophet’s
properties in Medina and the remainder of the khums of
Khaybar. When Abu Bakr said: “By Allah, I do not change
anything of the Prophet’s charities” he meant the
properties that Fatima asked for and he saw that she
asked to change them from their previous condition. When
he called them as the Prophet’s charities it meant that
he thought they were not the Prophet’s properties but
they were charities that the Prophet (s) managed during
his lifetime. Abu Bakr’s conclusion in the beginning of
the tradition showed that he did not want to prove that
the Prophet’s properties were not to be inherited but he
wanted
to prove that those properties, which
Fatima asked for, were not among the Prophet’s properties
because he mentioned that they were charities.
2. We can conclude out of some
variations of Abu Bakr’s tradition that he argued about the
prophets’ properties and he did not limit the dispute to the
previous point because the tradition, which mentioned
Fatima’s speech and the conclusion of Abu Bakr when he
mentioned the Prophet’s saying; “We, the prophets, do not
bequeath…..etc.” and when Fatima protested against him by
mentioning the general Quranic verses talking about the
matter of inheritance and the special verses talking about
the succession of some of the prophets, uncovered a new side
of the dispute where Abu Bakr denied the bequeathing of the
Prophet’s properties to his heirs and insisted on his denial
whereas Fatima insisted on arguing him[32]
and defended her opinion on the matter.
3. So the caliph had two traditions:
The first: “We do not bequeath. What we
leave is to be charity”. [33]
The second: “We, the prophets, do not
bequeath gold or silver”. [34]
He therefore claimed two things:
One of them that Fadak was charity and
so it was not to be inherited.
The other was that the Prophet’s properties were not to be
inherited. He used the first tradition to prove that Fadak
was charity and the second tradition to prove that the
Prophet did not
bequeath.
The results of the argument
1. It might be not difficult to sue the
caliph after his situation became clear and the notes we
noticed in the two traditions narrated by Abu Bakr, claiming
that the Prophet (s) had said them, were fixed. The censure
we got against Abu Bakr until now related to many points. We
refer to them here to conclude the results:
First: the caliph was not certain about his
tradition as we explained at the beginning of this chapter.
Second: it would be implausible to imagine that
the Prophet (s) confided the verdict of his inheritance to
Abu Bakr and hid it from his daughter and the rest of his
heirs. How did the Prophet confide this verdict to Abu Bakr?[35]
The Prophet was not used to meet Abu Bakr alone unless he
told him this news in a deliberate privacy so that it would
be ignorant by his heirs and especially his daughter, who
would receive a new ordeal-because of that-in addition to
her other pains!
Third:
Ali was the Prophet’s guardian undoubtedly according to the
true tradition narrated recurrently by the great companions
and recited in their poetry. Among those, who narrated the
tradition were Abdullah bin Abbas, Khuzayma bin Thabit al-Ansari,
Hujr bin Adiy, Abul Haytham bin al-Tayhan, Abdullah bin Abu
Sufyan bin al-Harth bin Abdul Muttalib, Hassaan bin Thabit
and Imam
Ali. [36]
The guardianship was one of the highest Islamic decorations
that no doubt only Ali possessed. [37]
Ali’s followers and Abu Bakr’s
followers disagreed on the meaning of guardianship. The
first great companions believed that it was a decree for
Ali’s caliphate but the others interpreted it and said: “Ali
is the guardian of the Prophet’s knowledge, Sharia and
affairs.” Now we do not want to oppose these or to support
those but we want to discuss the tradition as much as
concerning the subject of this research and then to decide
what result comes out of each interpretation.
Let us suppose first that the guardianship meant the
caliphate to try Abu Bakr’s situation in the light of the
tradition. We will find that he had usurped the most
precious Islamic values and had disposed of the fates of the
umma without any legal authority. So this man had no right
to rule or judge between people and any tradition of his
could not be believed. Let us abandon this interpretation
for it would be so severe to the caliph. Let us say: “Ali
was the guardian of the Prophet’s knowledge and Sharia.”
Then could we, while confessing such kind of holy
guardianship, believe in a tradition denied by the guardian
himself? And as long as he (Ali) was the wakeful guard of
the divine Sharia[38]
so his
opinion had to be obeyed in every
matter as an indisputable decree because he was the most
aware of what the Prophet (s) had recommended and entrusted
him with. And if Ali was the guardian of the Prophet’s
patrimonies and affairs, so what would be the meaning of
plundering the Prophet’s patrimonies by the caliph whereas
the Prophet’s guardian was available and he was more aware
of their verdict and legal fate?
Fourth: the nationalization of the Prophet’s
inheritance was one of the caliph’s initiatives in history.
It was unprecedented in any of the (prophets’) nations’
histories. If it was a basis followed by all, who ruled
after the prophets, it would be so famous and all the
nations of the prophets would know that.
Denying the Prophet’s ownership of Fadak by Abu Bakr-as it
was shown by some of his arguments with Fatima-had much
hastiness because Fadak was not gained as booty in war but
its people gave in because of fear as it was mentioned by
all the historians;[39]
Sunni and Shia. Each land, whose people gave up like that
(without fighting), was to be pure property of the Prophet
(s). [40]
Allah declared in the holy Quran that Fadak was of the
Prophet (s) by saying:
(And
whatever Allah restored to His Apostle from them you did not
press forward against it any horse or a riding camel.
Quran 59:6)
It was not proved that the Prophet (s) had granted Fadak as
charity or
he entailed it.
Fifth:
both of the traditions that Abu Bakr protested with in
this concern had no any evidence certifying what he
wanted to prove. We have already studied both variations
of the tradition and shown that their meanings had
nothing to do with the caliph’s intent. If this is not
acceptable, let us suppose the two meanings to be equal
and then no one could be preferred to the other in order
to depend on it.
2. These were the objections we already got. We add to
them now a sixth objection after supposing that the
phrase (We, the prophets, do not bequeath) is closer to
denying the verdict of bequeathing than to deny the
existence of the patrimony to be inherited and to
suppose the phrase as following: (We do not bequeath
what we leave as charity), which will be in the interest
of the caliph and to cancel the interpretation saying
that the charity left is not to be inherited and then to
study the case in the light of these accounts. The
clearest meaning of the caliph’s tradition, after
interpreting it according to all the possibilities,
determines that the prophets were not to bequeath their
patrimonies as it was clear in his saying: (We, the
prophets, do not bequeath). Let us have a look at his
saying: (We do not bequeath. What we leave is to be
charity). The pronoun refers to the plural that the
verdict concerns a group. Since the verdict in the
tradition concerns not bequeathing of the patrimony then
it is clear that it relates to the group of the prophets
because there is no another group that we can think that
their patrimonies are not to transfer to their heirs.
The holy Quran declared the matter of bequeathing by the
prophets. Allah, the Almighty, said about Zachariah:
(And
surely I fear my cousins after
me, and my wife is barren, therefore grant me from Thyself
an heir, who should inherit me and inherit from the children
of Yaqoub, and make him, my Lord, one in whom Thou art well
pleased.
19:5-6)
The inheritance in the verse means the inheritance of wealth
because it is wealth, which actually transfers from the
bequeather to the heir but knowledge and prophethood do not
transfer in the real sense. [41]
It is definitely clear that knowledge does not transfer
according to the theory of the union of the apprehender and
the apprehended data. [42]
But if we acknowledge the existential difference between
them, then there is no doubt of the abstractness of the
scientific images[43]
and that they (the scientific images) are existing in the
soul in an emanational existence, [44]
which means that it is an effect of the soul and the one
effect according to the soul-not by connection only-is
rectified by its cause and connected with it identically
so it is impossible for it to transfer to another cause.
And if we supposed that the apprehended images were
symptoms and qualities existing in the apprehender
immanently, it would be impossible to transfer because
of the impossibility of the movement of the symptom from
a subject to another as it was proved by philosophy
whether we thought of its abstractness or materiality in
accordance with our acknowledgement that the apprehended
images included the general aspects of the material
object like the ability of division and the likes.
So it is impossible for knowledge to
transfer according to the philosophical isms concerning the
scientific images.
And if we consider prophethood, we will
also find that it cannot be transferred whether we interpret
it according to the ism of some philosophers to say that it
is a rank of the spiritual perfection and a degree of the
virtuous human existence, to which the human essence ascends
towards the infinite perfection or we interpret it according
to the general concept understood by people that prophethood
is a divine position unlike the position of a king or a
vizier and that spiritual perfection is a condition for that
divine position. Hence in the first sense transfer cannot
occur because it is the very existence of the prophet with
his personal perfections and prophethood in the other sense
is impossible to be transferred too because it is a moral
matter with its specified aspects and it is not possible for
any aspect to transfer except by the change of the
individual himself into another individual. For example the
prophethood of Zachariah (S) concerned Zachariah himself. It
was not possible that it would refer to other than him for
it would not then be Zachariah’s prophethood but a new
position or a new prophethood.
In fact the initiative look at the
matter determines that it is impossible for prophethood and
knowledge to transfer with no need for prospect or lengthy
discussion on the matter. Reason decides easily that wealth
is the only thing that transfers by bequeathing and not
prophethood and knowledge.
3. Someone might object that the interpretation of
inheritance in Zachariah’s speech might not refer to wealth
because Yahya (Prophet John) was
martyred during his father’s life and
did not inherit his father’s wealth. So it must be
interpreted to refer to prophethood because Yahya inherited
the prophethood and that Allah responded to the prayer of
his father then. But this objection should not have to
concern one interpretation rather than the other because as
Yahya did not inherit his father’s wealth, neither did he
succeed him in prophethood. The prophethood of Yahya was not
hereditary and it was not the wish of Zachariah. Zachariah
asked his God to grant him an heir inheriting him after his
death when saying according to the holy Quran:
(And
surely I fear my cousins after me). [45]
He meant: (after my death). It was clear from his saying
that he wanted an heir succeeding him and not a prophet
coeval with him otherwise his fear from his cousins after
his death would remain. We have to explain the verse in a
way free from objection that the phrase
(Who
should inherit me and inherit from the children of Yaqoub.
19:6) was to be an answer for his prayer. His
prayer meant: “O my God, grant me a son to inherit me!” So
what he asked his God for was realized when he got a son.
Bequeathing him wealth or prophethood was not included in
what Zachariah asked his God for but it was as a result of
what he asked for in his prayer.
If we noticed the story of Zachariah in
its other place of the holy Quran, we would find that he did
not ask his God but for good offspring. Allah said:
(There
did Zachariah pray to his Lord; he said: My Lord! grant me
from Thee good offspring. Quran 3:38)
The best way of understanding the holy Quran is what is
explained by the Quran itself. [46]
Hence we
understand from the verse that
Zachariah did not ask his God but for good offspring. The
Quran gathered Zachariah’s prayer in one phrase one time and
made individual phrases at another time for each of the
offspring and his description when saying:
(…grant
me from Thyself an heir) to show his asking for
the offspring and:
(...and
make him, my Lord, one in whom Thou art well pleased)
to show that he prayed Allah that his offspring would be
good. If we gathered these two phrases, they would refer to
the same meaning of the phrase
(My
Lord! grant me from Thee good offspring). Then
the phrase of
(inherit
me)
would get out of the prayer after comparing
between the two phrases of the Quran. It must be then as the
answer of the payer.
4. According to that it was clear that the word of
inheritance mentioned in the Quranic verse was burdened with
usage to mean inheriting the prophethood because it would be
the answer to the prayer if it was inherent in what was
asked for (in the prayer) and it would be realized always or
more often whenever the required thing was available. But
inheriting the prophethood was not inherent in the
availability of the offspring at all. In fact it might not
happen for hundreds of millions of people because
prophethood required nonesuch qualification and great
perfection therefore prophethood with its unique loftiness
could not be put as an answer for asking Allah for a good
offspring because the proportion between the human beings
and those, who were well-qualified to undertake the divine
mission, was as the proportion between the units and the
millions. But as for inheriting wealth, it could be as the
answer to Zachariah’s prayer because the offspring might
live after the father’s death at most and so inheriting
wealth could be as a result of the
availability of the offspring in the most cases. In
addition to that, Zachariah himself did not think that
prophethood was inherent in his offspring nor any of the
spiritual ranks lower than prophethood, therefore he
asked his God after that to make his son be content.
5. Let us leave that away to study
the subject of the inheritance in the verse. The word
(inherit)
referred to inheriting wealth undoubtedly. What
determined this meaning for the word were two things:
The first: If Zachariah had asked
his God to grant him a son to inherit his prophethood,
he would not have asked Him after that to make his son
be content because he had asked in his first prayer for
something higher than contentment.
The second: if ignoring the matter of inheritance in the
story of Zachariah mentioned in the sura of Aal Imran
did not show that inheritance was out of the prayer, it
would, at least, show that the meaning of inheritance
mentioned in the story in the other place of the Quran
referred to the inheritance of wealth and not
prophethood because if Zachariah had asked his God for
two things; one was to grant him a good content son and
the other thing was to make his son inherit his
prophethood, the holy Quran would not be limited to the
first thing Zachariah had asked for because it had no
value in comparison with prophethood. In order to agree
with me on this, suppose that someone asked you for a
garden and a dirham and you granted him both. When you
wanted to relate the story, would you mention the
dirham? I do not think you would do that unless you were
too humble. The preference of the garden to the dirham
in the account of the material values is less than the
preference of
prophethood to the goodness of the
offspring in the account of the spiritual morals. Hence the
story of Zachariah mentioned in the sura of Aal Imran, which
had nothing much or little about inheritance, was as
evidence of that inheritance referring to the inheritance of
wealth and not prophethood, otherwise it would be the most
important part of the story that would not be ignored.
Sixth: some of the researchers noticed in the
holy verse two points interpreting inheritance as the
inheritance of prophethood:
The first: Zachariah’s saying after
(inherit
me):
(and
inherit from the children of Yaqoub) that Yahya was not to inherit wealth from the
offspring of Yaqoub (Jacob) but he might inherit prophethood
and wisdom.
The second: what Prophet Zachariah said
as a preface for his prayer:
(And
surely I fear my cousins after me) that he feared
for religion and wished it to last by the lasting of the
prophethood because this was the most suitable for the
prophets to fear for and not the properties whether they
reached their heirs or not.
Our fellows (the Shia) objected to the
first point by saying that Zachariah did not ask God that
his son was to inherit all the properties of Yaqoub’s
offspring but some of them. So this would not be as evidence
to their claimed interpretation.
As for the second point, it is an inference confirming the
interpretation we chose because fearing for religion and
knowledge from the cousins had no meaning because the divine
mercy would not leave people in vain without any guide. The
religion and the word of Heaven would be protected by Allah
and prophethood was always granted to the few highly
distinguished people with no any fear for
being extorted or stolen. So what
would Zachariah think of his God to do if He did not
grant him Yahya? Was it possible that Allah would
entrust Zachariah’s cousins with the divine mission in
spite of that they were not well qualified to undertake
this divine task and they did not deserve this honor? Or
did he think that Allah would ignore the affairs of His
people so that they would have the evidence to protest
against Him (on the Day of Punishment)? Neither this nor
that would be possible for any prophet to think of.
Zachariah was afraid of his cousins to seize his wealth,
therefore he asked his God to grant him a contented son
in order to inherit his wealth. He would not be blamed
for that because he might wish to turn his properties
away from his cousins, who would spend them wrongly in
the way of sin and corruption as long as they were
wicked and immoral until it was said that they were the
worst among the Israelites.
Ibn Abul Hadeed (the author of
Sharh Nahjul Balagha) tried to show a side of
Zachariah’s fear for religion in two ways:
The first: according to the beliefs of the Shia when he
mentioned that the prophet’s fear for religion would not
be acceptable in the Shia point of view because people
were deprived, by the absence of the Imam, [47]
of many mercies related to the legal matters like
punishments, Friday prayer and Eids. They (the Shia)
said that people were to be blamed for that because they
themselves deprived themselves of those mercies. So
Zachariah had not to worry about changing the religion
and spoiling the legal laws because Allah had to inform
of His mission to the people by the prophet
and if the people changed the religion and spoiled the
divine verdicts, Allah would not have to keep the religion
because people themselves deprived themselves of the
mercies. [48]
I would like to record my note about
this speech before I move to the second point. I say: the
worry about the desistance of prophethood, according to the
beliefs of the Shia, would be true if it arose from the
possibility of that people might spoil their religion in a
way that they would not deserve mercies as it was during the
absence of the expected Imam (s) and not because there were
no ones well qualified for prophethood when the people were
in need of it. In this case sending a prophet or appointing
someone replacing him would be necessary for Allah to do
because He Himself promised to spread mercy among His
people. So the insufficiency of the cousins to gain the
divine position would not lead Zachariah to expect the
desistance of prophethood and the effacement of the
religious properties if people deserved the divine mercies.
And if people did not deserve the divine mercies, it would
be possible for the connection between the Heaven and the
earth to be cut whether the cousins (of Zachariah) were good
or bad and whether Allah granted Zachariah a son or let him
remain sterile. The Quranic verse showed that the cause,
which made Zachariah worry, was the corruption of his
cousins and not the corruption of people.
The second: by interpreting the word
(mawali)[49]
mentioned in the verse to mean emirs. It would
mean that Zachariah feared that the
emirs and the rulers after his death might spoil the
religion, therefore he asked Allah for a son, who was to be
granted prophethood and knowledge in order to preserve the
religion. [50]
We are to ask about those rulers, whom
Zachariah feared that they might spoil the religion. Were
they the prophets, who would succeed him, or the rulers, who
had nothing to do with the Heaven? If they were the
prophets, so there would be no need for fear because they
would have been infallible prophets but if they were the
kings, they might have been a threat to religion. But we
should notice if the existence of the prophet would prevent
them from playing with the Sharia and disrespecting the
divine laws or not. If the existence of the prophet would
suffice to safeguard the Sharia and keep its dignity, then
why did Zachariah fear those emirs whereas the divine mercy
promised to keep the continuity of prophethood throughout
the human history and to keep the eternality of the
connection between the Heaven and the earth as long as the
earth would be ready to receive the divine instruction? And
if the existence of the prophet was not sufficient to
safeguard the religion, so the existence of Zachariah’s son,
who was to inherit the prophethood, would not remove fearing
the rulers as long as the prophet would be unable to stand
against the ruling power and as long as the emirs would be
of the trickers whereas the verse showed that Zachariah’s
fear would be removed if he was granted a contented son to
inherit him.
The result of this research showed that the inheritance
mentioned in the verse referred to the
inheritance of wealth undoubtedly. It
showed that some prophets bequeathed while the tradition of
Abu Bakr determined that all the prophets did not bequeath.
The Quranic verse and Abu Bakr’s
tradition were contradicted and whatever contradicted[51]
the holy Quran must be null.
We were not to exclude Zachariah from
the rest of the prophets because the tradition of Abu Bakr
did not accept such exclusion or differentiate between
Zachariah and the others. If prophethood required not
bequeathing so all the prophets would not bequeath. We do
not think that the prophethood of Zachariah had a special
aspect that made him bequeath rather than the rest of the
prophets. What was the guilt of Zachariah, or what was his
virtue that gave him this excellence? Then why do we have to
burden the word (prophets) mentioned in the tradition with
more than its actual meaning? In any case it is just an
interpretation so why do we interpret the tradition as the
Prophet’s patrimony was not to be inherited and then to be
obliged to say that Prophet Muhammad (s) meant by (the
prophets) other than Zachariah? Let us take the other
interpretation to understand the tradition as that the
prophets had nothing of value to bequeath and so we will
keep the truth that the wording of the tradition refers to.
If the tradition actually had the meaning that Abu Bakr
intended to show, it would contradict the holy Quran and
then it must be brushed aside. The matter had no any way to
consider the tradition as
legal evidence about the subject of
bequeathing and so the caliph did not have any answer to
defend himself against his opponent, who protested with
the previous Quranic verse, and no one of his companions
succeeded in defending him. It was so because they
realized that the tradition, which justified the rulers’
situation, contradicted the Quranic verse.
It could not be possible to justify
the caliph’s situation by saying that he chose one of
the contradicted forms of the tradition and carried it
out as some Muslim jurisprudents thought, because
whatever contradicted the holy Quran would definitely be
null.
The matter of donation
It was the dispute between the
caliph and Fatima (s) when she argued that the Prophet
(s) had donated Fadak to her. Imam Ali and Umm Aymen
witnessed of that but the caliph refused Fatima’s claim[52]
and was not satisfied with these two witnesses and asked
her to bring two men or a man and two women as
witnesses.
1. The first thing that we would
blame Abu Bakr for was his situation in this case as a
ruler in spite of that his caliphate did not gain the
legal quality until that day at least. [53]
But now we do not want to study this blame because such
argument will take us to wider horizons.
2. The second note about the subject is that if Fadak
was with Fatima, then she would not have to have any
evidence. There were two things about this
note:
First: in whose possession Fadak was?
Was it really in Fatima’s possession? We could understand
that from the letter of Imam Ali to Othman bin Hunayf: “Yes,
Fadak (only) was in our possession away from all what were
under the heaven but some
people became
stingy with it and others turned away from it”. [54]
This means that Fadak was in the Prophet’s family’s
possession. This was confirmed by the traditions of the
Shia.
The meaning of Imam Ali’s speech showed
that Fadak was in Imam Ali and Fatima’s possession and it
could not be interpreted as it was in the Prophet’s
possession; first because the Prophet’s possession meant the
Prophet’s family’s possession and second because the Prophet
had his own properties other than Fadak.
Second: was possession as evidence of
ownership? Yes, the Muslims agreed on this unanimously. [55]
If it was not so, the social system of the human life would
be disordered.
Someone might object by saying that if Fadak was in Fatima’s
possession, so why she did not protest with this evidence.
It would suffice for her than to claim it was donated to her
and to protest with the Quranic verses of the inheritance.
In the documents of the Shia about this case there was an
answer to this objection for they mentioned the protest of
the Prophet’s family against the caliph by means of the very
evidence but we did not want to study the case in the light of
something of that.
But we should notice that Fadak was
a very wide land and was not like small properties,
whose possession would be known easily. If we supposed
that Fadak was in Fatima’s possession and it was
undertaken by her agent, who managed it, so who would
know this other than the agent?
We knew well that Fadak was not
near Medina so that the people of Medina would know
about its affairs or the person, who managed it. It was
at a distance of some days from Medina and it was a
Jewish village.
[56] It was not in the Islamic
environment to be known among the Muslims that it was in
Fatima’s possession.
Fatima thought if she claimed her
possession of Fadak that the caliph would ask her for
evidence as he asked her about the donation as long as
he-in her opinion-was controlled by a prevailing power
of his tendency that did not make him confess anything.
It was easy for the (whale) on that day to swallow
Fatima’s agent of Fadak and anyone else, who knew the
truth, as it swallowed Abu Sa’eed al-Khidri and
prevented him from telling the truth of the donation of
Fadak whereas he told of it after that as it was
mentioned in the Sunni and Shia books, or it was easy
for the jinn to kill as they killed Sa’d bin Obada and
relieved the caliph Omar[57]
from him, or to accuse anyone of being apostate if he
refused to give the zakat to the caliph as those, who
refused to give the zakat of the Muslims to the
caliph Abu Bakr, were accused. [58]
3. Let us leave this argument aside to
get to the basic matter, which is: did Abu Bakr believe in
the infallibility of Fatima and the verse of purification,
which purified the Prophet’s family, among which was Fatima,
from any sin or not?
We do not want to discuss in details
the concept of infallibility or to prove it for Fatima by
the verse of purification because the books of the Shia
about the virtues of the Prophet’s family suffice the task.
We do not doubt that the caliph was aware of that because
his daughter Aa’isha herself often narrated that the verse
of purification concerned Fatima, her husband and her two
sons[59]
as it was declared by the Sunni and Shia books of Hadith.
Whenever the Prophet (s) went to the mosque to offer the
Fajr[60]
prayer, after the revelation of this verse, he passed by
Fatima’s house and called out: “O people of the house, it is
the (time for) prayer.
(Allah
only desires to keep away the uncleanness from you, O people
of the House! and to purify you a (thorough) purifying.
Quran 33:33)”
He kept on that for six months. [61]
So why did Abu Bakr ask Fatima for
evidence? Did the claim, whose truthfulness was certified,
need evidence?
Those, who objected to Abu Bakr, said: “Evidence is needed
to confirm the truthfulness of the claimant, but being
certain (of the claimant’s truthfulness) is firmer (than the
evidence). If it is necessary to judge for the one, who has
true evidence, it must be judged for the
one, whose truthfulness is known by the judge.”
There is a weakness in this
justification because the comparison did not occur between
the evidence and the certainty of the judge in addition to
the actual reality, but it considered the effect of each of
them on the judge and the result was that knowledge was to
be firmer than the evidence because certainty was firmer
than supposition. The comparison had to regard the nearest
of the two to the truth that was to be regarded in every
dispute. The knowledge of the judge, in this kind of
comparison, was not to be preferred to the evidence because
a judge might mistake as evidence might mistake. Both of
them were equal in the regard of falling into error.
But there was something in the matter that the researchers
ignored. It was impossible for the caliph’s knowledge about
Fatima’s truthfulness[62]
to be but the truth because the reason behind his knowledge
of her truthfulness was not of those reasons that might lead
to errors or mistakes but it was the holy Quran, which
declared her infallibility. [63]
In the light of this quality of knowing Fatima’s
truthfulness, we could determine that the evidence, even if
it was the legal proof, on which the judgment would depend,
might fall into error. But the knowledge that could never
fall into error, because of the witness of Allah, was
worthier to be relied on when judging.
In another way we say: if the holy
Quran had declared Fatima’s ownership of Fadak, then the
matter would not have had any way of doubting or hesitating
for any Muslim to judge. It was much clear that declaring
the infallibility of Fatima by the holy Quran would strongly
confirm her claim about her donation because the infallible
would never lie and whenever claiming, the claim was
definitely true. There would be no difference between
determining the infallibility and determining the donation
as related to the case, except that the ownership of Fadak
by Fatima (s) was the literary meaning of the second text
(the tradition) and the perceived concept of the first text
(the verse) via its literary conception.
4. None 0f the Muslims ever doubted
about Fatima’s truthfulness and no one ever accused her of
fabricating but the dispute arose between the disputers that
whether knowing the truthfulness of the claim would be
sufficient evidence for judgment or not. Let us put the
verse of purification aside for a moment and suppose that
Abu Bakr was like anyone of the other Muslims and then his
knowledge of Fatima’s truthfulness did not have the quality
we referred to in the previous point but it was as the rest
of thoughts, which would be liable to errors and mistakes.
But nevertheless the ruler might judge according to his
knowledge[64]
or he might depend on the evidence as it was mentioned in
the holy Quran. Allah said:
(..and
that when you judge between people you judge with justice.
4:58)
and:
(And
of those whom We have created are a people who guide with
the truth and
thereby they do justice. 7:181),
which means that they judge with justice.
There are two
notes about truth and justice:
First: truth and
justice as an actual and real
matter.
Second: truth
and justice according to the judicial criteria.
So judgment according to the evidence is right and just
in the light of this note even if it fails in error. In
opposition to that, judgment according to the witness of
a sinner (fasiq) is neither right nor just even if the
sinner is truthful in his saying.
If the two previous verses referred
to the first meaning of truth and justice then they
would show that judgment according to the actual reality
was to be true with no need to the evidence. If the
ruler found someone’s ownership of a certain property,
he could judge of that because he thought it was the
fixed truth according to the actual reality. His
judgment for that person of being the owner of that
property would be the confirmation-in his opinion-of
judgment with truth and justice that Allah had ordered
to be followed. But if we interpreted the two verses
according to the second meaning that was according to
the judicial criteria hence the two verses could not be
of any use in this concern because they did not
prove-then-that any judgment would be right and
according to the criteria! And which judgment would be
but so?
It was clear that the concept understood from the verses
referred to the first meaning and specially the word
truth
because whatever was described by this word would be
understood that that thing was a fixed true matter. So
to judge with truth was as determining a fixed fact. The
form of the first verse showed that. It included
judgment
with justice. It was clear that the
application of the Islamic rules in the case of a dispute
would not need a legal order because their very legislation
as law for judgment meant that they must be applied. And so
the order of keeping to the law would not be but to remind
and to warn and had nothing to do with the essence of the
matter. The order of judging according to the actual facts,
whether they had evidence and witness or not, was a part of
the essence of the matter because it was a new determination
showing that the reality was the basis of the Islamic
judgment and the axis, around which it should turn without
being limited to formalities and special evidences. [65]
Then the two verses were considered as evidence of
respecting the judge’s knowledge in the Islamic judicial
laws. [66]
In addition to that Abu Bakr himself
often was satisfied with claims without any evidence. It was
mentioned in al-Bukhari’s Sahih[67]
that when the Prophet (s) died, Abu Bakr received a sum of
money from al-Ala’ bin al-Hadhrami. Abu Bakr announced:
“Whoever the Prophet (s) was in debt for or that the Prophet
had promised a gift, let him come to us”. Jabir said: “The
Prophet had promised to give me so and so and so…” He
extended his hand three times. Jabir said: “He (Abu Bakr)
put in my hand five hundred (either dirham or dinar) then
five hundred then five hundred”.
It was mentioned in at-Tabaqat al-Kubra
by ibn Sa’d[68]
that Abu Sa’eed al-Khidry had said: “I heard the caller of
Abu Bakr, when he received a sum of money from Bahrain
calling in Medina: “Let whoever the Prophet (s) had promised
to gift, come to us”. Many men came to him and he gave them
money. Abu Basheer al-Maziny came to Abu Bakr and said: “The
Prophet (s) said to me: O Abu Basheer, come to us if we get
something (of money)”. Abu Bakr gave him two or three
handfuls. After counting them they found that they were one
thousand and four hundred dirhams”.
If Abu Bakr did not ask anyone of the
companions about any evidence so why did he ask Fatima for
evidence regarding her gift?
Did the judicial system apply to Fatima
alone or were there special political circumstances behind
all that?
It was really odd to accept a companion’s claim of being
promised by the Prophet (s) to be given a sum of money and
to deny the claim of Fatima, the
Prophet’s daughter, just because she
did not find evidence to prove what she claimed.
And if knowing the truthfulness of the
claimant permitted to give him what he claimed,
was not Fatima more deserving of not
being suspected by he, who did not suspect Jabir or Abu
Basheer of lying?
If the caliph did not give those, who
claimed that the Prophet had promised them of what they
asked for according to their claim but according to the
possibility of their truthfulness-and the imam had the right
to give anyone any sum-then why would not he do the same
with the case of Fadak?
Thus the caliph fulfilled the Prophet’s
promises, which had no evidence, and ignored his (the
Prophet’s) donation to his daughter, the head of the women
of the world. The question about the difference between the
debts and promises on one hand and the donation on the other
remained without an acceptable answer!
5. Let us resume our argument in a new
way: that the ruler could not judge the claim that he
already knew its truthfulness if the claimant could not find
any evidence proving his claim and let us for now ignore the
result we got in the previous point to ask according to this
account:
First: What prevented Abu Bakr from witnessing to the
donation of Fadak if he had known the truthfulness of Fatima
(s)? He could join his witness to Imam Ali’s witness[69]
and so the evidence would be sufficient and the right would
be fixed. And since he himself was the judge, it would not
annul his witness because the witness of the judge[70]
was to be taken into account and it
was not irrelevant to the legal evidence, which would be
the reference in the disputes.
Second: about the acceptable
interpretation showing that the caliph ignored the
reality that was well known for him. In order to explain
this point, we had to differentiate between two things
that confused the researchers, who studied the case.
One: it was to judge for the
claimant what she claimed.
The other: it was to carry out the
effects of the actual reality.
If we supposed that the first was limited to the
evidence, the other would be obligatory because it was
not a judgment to be bound to its limits. If someone
knew that his house belonged to another and he handed it
over to him, this would not be a confession of his
ownership but it would be carrying out the judgments
determined by the law. Also if someone claimed before
the judge that the house, which was in his possession,
was his own then the judge and anyone of the Muslims had
to consider that house as any of the other properties of
that claimant. This did not mean that the judge judged
that the house was the claimant’s property according to
the principle of the possession of the hand[71]
or being under one’s control. The Muslims got themselves
to follow this judgment. In fact even if there was no
judge among them, they must keep to that. Neither the
controlling of a property nor the possession of the hand
were among the criteria of judgment in the Sharia but
they made it necessary to apply the judgments of the
actual reality.
The difference between the judgment of
the judge about someone’s ownership, or his sinfulness or
any of the other affairs, which the judge’s authority held,
and between the application of the effects of these matters
was that judgment decided the dispute that was to be
considered as an excellence of the judgment. It meant that
if the judge pronounced a judgment, it would be prohibited
for all the Muslims to annul it and it would be obeyed
without looking for any other excuse but to the very
judgment.
But as for the judge’s application of
the effects of the ownership without judgment, would not
have that regard and not every Muslim had to follow it and
to carry out those effects except if he (any Muslim) got the
knowledge of that as what the judge got.
The result: if the caliph knew of
Fatima’s ownership of Fadak, it would be compulsory for him
not to make use of it in any way she disliked and he was not
to extort it from her whether it was permissible for him to
judge according to his knowledge or not. There was no any
other disputer in the case, who would dispute Fatima about
Fadak, in order to be asked to swear and then he would
deserve it if he swore because the property that Fatima
asked for was either hers or the Muslims’.
We assume that Abu Bakr was the legal caliph of the Muslims
at that time; therefore he would be their guardian, who was
to be responsible to guard their rights and properties. If
Fatima was truthful according to his opinion and there was
no one to litigate her, then the caliph had no right to
extort Fadak from her. Deciding the case according to the
evidence only prohibited the judgment and would not permit
seizing the property from its owner.
Then the impermissibility of a judgment decided by a
judge according to his own knowledge[72]
would not commute the punishment and would not take the
caliph out of the test successfully.
Footnotes:
1. Refer to Sunan of al-Bayhaqi, vol.6 p.297-302 and Sharh Nahjul Balagha,
vol.16 p.214, 218, 219, 221, 227.
2. Sibt bin aj-Jawzi in his book as-Seera al-Halabiya, vol.3 p.363, Sharh Nahjul
Balagha, vol.16 p.234.
3. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.234-235.
4. Murooj ath-Thahab, vl.2 p.193.
5. This may weaken the tradition mentioned above because if Abu Bakr was ready
to recall, he would have responded to Fatima in the mosque when she scolded him
so bitterly.
6. At-Tabari’s Tareekh, vo.2 p.353, Sumoow al-Ma’na fe Sumoow ath-That by al-Alayili,
p.18.
7. At-Tabari’s Tareekh, vol.3 p.349.
8. Ahmad’s Musnad, vol.2 p.236.
9. Al-Bukhari’s Sahih, vol.5 p.83, Muslims Sahih, vol.4 p.1902, History of
Baghdad by al-khateeb al-Baghdadi, vol.17 p.203 and Ahmad’s Musnad, vol.1 p.6.
10. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.316, al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.6 p.301.
11. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.252, 214, al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.6 p.300.
12. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.224, 218, al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.6 p.301.
13. Proviso: ar-Razi said: if the wording refers to one meaning and has no
possibility to refer to another it is proviso (nass).
14. Mujmal means that the wording refers to two meanings equally. Refer to at-Tafseer
al-Kabeer by al-Fakhr ar-Razi, vol.7 p.18. It was mentioned in Ma’arij al-Ussool
by al-Hilli p.105 that: “Proviso (nass) is the wording that refers to its very
meaning and not to any other than what it is said for but the (mujmal) summary
refers to some meanings and it is not limited to its wording…”. Refer to Bayan
an-Nussoss at-Tashree’iyya by Badran Abul Aynayn, p.5 and al-Misbah al-Muneer,
vol.2 p.654.
15. Al-Misbah al-Muneer, vol.2 p.654.
16. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.216.
17. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.214.
18. This tradition was mentioned in other wording having the same meaning. The
Prophet (s) said: “The believer is not to inherit from the unbeliever and the
unbeliever is not to inherit from the believer”. Refer to Sunan of ibn Maja,
vol.2 p.164 and Sahih of Abu Dawood, vol.2 p.19.
19. Refer to Jawahir al-Balagha by Ahmed al-Hashimi p.363.
20. With reference to the Quranic verse: (Allah enjoins you concerning your
children: The male shall have the equal of the portion of two females; then if
they are more than two females, they shall have two‑thirds of what the deceased
has left, and if there is one, she shall have the half; and as for his parents,
each of them shall have the sixth of what he has left if he has a child, but if
he has no child and (only) his two parents inherit him, then his mother shall
have the third; but if he has brothers, then his mother shall have the sixth
after (the payment of) a bequest he may have bequeathed or a debt). 4:11.
21. Ibn Sa’d’s Tabaqat, vol.2 p.315.
22. It was clear that if only one respected truthful man narrated a tradition,
the tradition would be regarded as true but as Fatima protested by the Quranic
verses it was clear that she did not recognize the truthfulness and fairness of
Abu Bakr.
23. The guardianship of Imam Ali was proved by many evidences. As for the Shia,
they agreed on that unanimously and they agreed that it included the caliphate
also. As for the others, it was also proved but in the special meaning. Refer to
at-Tabari’s Tareekh, vol.2 and al-Muraja’at by Abdul Hussayn Sharafuddeen p.236.
24. Ibn Abu Quhafa was the surname of Abu Bakr.
25. We quoted this passage in short. Imam Ali’s wide knowledge about every thing
of the Quran was so famous for every one. Refer to al-Ittiqan by as-Sayooti,
vol.4 p.233, ibn Sa’d’s Tabaqat, vol.2 p.338 and as-Sawa’iqul Muhriqa by ibn
Hajar, p.173.
26. The greatest two tribes of the Ansar.
27. She means: why do not you help me and defend my right?
28. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.212-213.
29. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.214.
30. ibid.
31. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.218.
32. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.211.
33. ibid.vol.16 p.218 and refer to al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.6 p.300-301. (In
Arabic this tradition may have another form : “We do not bequeath what we leave
as charity”) The translator.
34. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.252.
35. Aa’isha said: “They disagreed about his inheritance (the Prophet’s
inheritance). We did not find any one knowing about it. Then Abu Bakr said: “I
heard the Prophet saying: We, the prophets, do not bequeath…etc.” Refer to
as-Sawa’qul Muhriqa by ibn Hajar p.34 and Tareekh al-Khulafa’ by as-Sayooti,
p.73.
36. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.1 p.47-48 and vol.3 p.15.
37. Ibn Abul Hadeed said in his book Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.1 p.46: “we
believe undoubtedly that Ali was the Prophet’s guardian, although some ones,
whom we consider as resistants, opposed that”.
38. Refer to the Prophet’s saying: “Ali is with the Quran and the Quran is with
Ali. They will not separate until they came to me at the pond (in Paradise)”.
Refer to al-Mu’jam as-Sagheer by at-Tabarani. The Prophet (s) chose Ali among
all his companions and relatives in entrusting him with seventeen decrees that
he did not entrust any one with other than Ali. The Prophet (s) said: “Ali is
with the truth and the truth is with Ali”. He (s) also said: “Ali is from me and
I am from him. No one is to carry out my tasks except him…”.Refer to
as-Sawa’iqul Muhriqa by ibn Hajar p.122 and ibn Assakir’s Tareekh, vol.17
p.256-.
39. Futooh al-Buldan by al-Balathari, p.46, ibnul Atheer’s Tareekh, vol.2 p.321,
Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.4 p.78 and ibn Hisham’s Seera, vol.2 p.368.
40.
Tafseer al-Kashshaf by az-Zamakhshari, vol.4 p.502.
41. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.241.
42. The concept of this theory is that the apprehended images, which are
abstract, have no material aspects except that they are apprehended.
Apprehension is the essence of these apprehended images. Divesting these data of
the apprehender means divesting the data of their very essence. This is the sign
of the existential unity. So the graduation of the soul in the ranks of
knowledge is its graduation in the stages of the existence. Whatever the psychic
existence becomes a confirmation for a new concept; it will be increased in its
essential integration and will become of a higher rank. There is nothing at all
preventing from the union of many concepts in the existence. This is not like
the existential union of two existences or the conceptional union of two
concepts. These two unions are impossible and not like that of the apprehender
and the apprehended data.
43. The truth is that all the ranks of knowledge and all the apprehended images
are abstract but they are different in the ranks of abstractness. The thing
apprehended by the ego will not be the very actual thing with its material
identity, even that, which is apprehended by the sense of sight, has a way of
abstractness and may be not defined exactly by the emanation of the ray or by
the impression. What was proved about the seeing related to the science of
mirrors and the researches of physics, which interpreted the optical perception
philosophically, confirmed the thought of abstractness. We have to acknowledge
it besides imagination and mind. We have explained this ism in our book The
Divine Belief in Islam.
44. and not immanental existence, which means to be as symptoms for the soul.
Some philosophers adopted this ism in order to solve the problem, which occurred
to the researchers when they wanted to adapt the evidences of the mental
existence to what was known about science as it was quality, which meant that if
the apprehended image was quality so what we would perceive of a human being was
not essence because it was a quality and not a human being while every human
being was to be essence. When all of the answers, which was put to solve the
problem of denying the mental existence, determining the idealism, choosing
multiplicity, considering science as symptom and the apprehended data as essence
and interpreting the essence as it was the outside independent existent and not
the mental existent failed, the later researchers became obliged to determine
that the apprehended image was of the essence and not of the quality but the
great Islamic philosopher, Sadruddeen ash-Shirazi mentioned in his Asfar that it
was essence in its quiddity and quality in its presentation. We could object to
him by saying that all what was in the presentation would end to what was in the
soul. Then we had to suppose a real quality united with the image to be quality
in the presentation. Then the theory would get to one of two things; either
keeping to the multiplicity of what was there in the soul or colliding with the
first problem itself. It would be better to determine that the image apprehended
by man was to be essence and not in presentation at all and its connection with
the soul was as the connection between the cause and effect and not the
presentation with its subject.
45. Quran 19:5. Refer to Tafseer al-Kashshaf, vol.3 p.4.
46. iAl-Ittiqan by as-Sayooti, vol.4 p.200.
47. The twelfth and final infallible imam, whom the Shia have been expecting to
come in order to spread justice all over the world.
48. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.257.
49. Mawali is the word, which was interpreted as cousins.
50. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.257-258.
51. Prophet Muhammad (s) said: “Whatever contradicts the Book of Allah, you are
to brush aside,… or to leave aside…” Refer to Ussool al-Kafi by al-Kulayni,
vol.1 p.55 and ar-Radd ala Siyer al-Awza’ei by Yousuf al-Ansari p.25.
52. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.216.
53. After ten days of the caliphate that yet the Hashimites and some of the
great companions did not pay homage to Abu Bakr to be the legal caliph. Refer to
at-Tabari’s Tareekh, vol.2 p.233.
54. Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.208.
55. Refer to al-Qawa’id al-Fiqhiyya by Hassan al-Bajnawardi, vol.1 p.113,
al-Muhalla by ibn Hazm, vol.9 p.436, al-Muhaththab by ash-Shirazi ash-Safi’ee,
vol.2 p.312, al-Furooq by al-Qirafi al-Maliki, vol.4 p.78 and Tahreer al-Majalla
by sheikh Muammad Hussayn Kashif al-Ghita’, vol.4 p.150.
56. Refer to Futooh al-Buldan by al-Balathari, p.42-43.
57. The tradition showed clearly that Omar sent a messenger to kill Sa’d if he
did not pay homage (to Omar) and when Sa’d refused to pay homage, the messenger
killed him. (They claimed that the jinn had killed him). Refer to al-Iqd
al-Fareed by ibn Abd Rabbih, vol.4 p.247.
58. As in the story of Malik bin Nuwayra. Refer to at-Tabari’s Tareekh, vol.2
p.273 and the edited one, vol.2 p.28.
59. Muslim’s Sahih, vol.3 p.331, al-Mustadrak, vol.3 p.159 and at-Taj aj-Jami’
lil Ussool by Mansoor Ali Nassif, vol.3 p.333.
60. The dawn.
61. Ahmad’s Musnad, vol.3 p.295, al-Mustadrak, vol.3 p.172.
62. Refer to Abu Bakr’s saying about the truthfulness of Fatima in Sharh Nahjul
Balagha, vol.16 p.216.
63. As in the verse: (Allah only desires to keep away the uncleanness from you,
O people of the House! and to purify you a (thorough) purifying) 33:33.Refer to
al-Mustadrak, vol.3 p.160-161 and Muslim’s Sahih, vol.5 p.37.
64. l-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.10 p.142, Tanqeeh al-Adilleh by Muhammad Reza
al-Ha’iri and Bidayet al-Mujtahid by ibn Rushd, vol.2 p.465.
65. If we want to translate this meaning into the scientific language we say:
according to the second account the order is a guiding order (optional) and
there is no possibility for the obligatory order because the thing ordered to be
followed is itself enough to be an incentive to acting. Regarding the order as
obligatory determines to turn the word (justice) to the second meaning because
there is a possibility for the order to be obligatory by following the reality
if the evidence confirms it and a possibility of following the order at all.
I apologize for not using the scientific idioms concerning logic, philosophy,
jurisprudence and fundamentals of Islam unless I am obliged to do that because I
try to make the research be understood by the ordinary readers.
66. If it was said that the tradition narrated by the Prophet’s family about
that, who judged with truth and he did not know the real judgement that he would
deserve punishment and then it showed that judgement did not rely on the actual
reality. Hence the matter would turn between casting the tradition away from
showing not executing the judgement and considering the punishment to be
unjustified and between considering the two verses to refer to the second
meaning. I would say: no one of these two interpretations was true but the
tradition kept to the verses in regard to the judge’s knowledge. And so the
subject of the judgement would be combined of the actual reality and the
knowledge of it or in other words it would be the result of the actual reality.
67. Vol.2 p.953.
68. vol.2 p.318.
69. So that the witness would be of two men, which was the legal condition for
the witness to be accepted.
70. The witness of the judge is permissible. Refer to al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.10
p.131.
71. The principle of the hand means proving the ownership by the hand, which
means the full control over that certain property.
72. Refer to al-Bayhaqi’s Sunan, vol.10 p.143-144.